General Psychiatric Syndrome: A New Perspective on the Theory of Unitary Psychosis

Review Article

J Psychiatry Mental Disord. 2025; 10(1): 1083.

General Psychiatric Syndrome: A New Perspective on the Theory of Unitary Psychosis

Marcelo Caixeta*

Goiânia, Brazil

*Corresponding author: Marcelo Caixeta, Goiânia, Brazil Email: psychological.medicine1@gmail.com

Received: June 09, 2025 Accepted: June 23, 2025 Published: June 25, 2025

Abstract

This article revisits the classical concept of Einheitspsychose—or unitary psychosis—originally proposed by 19th-century European psychiatry, and reformulates it into a modern nosological and pathophysiological framework named the General Psychiatric Syndrome. The traditional dichotomy between schizophrenia and affective disorders is questioned through historical, clinical, and biological evidence suggesting a shared neurodevelopmental and genetic basis for a wide range of psychiatric syndromes. Drawing from more than four decades of hospital-based psychiatric experience, the author proposes that conditions like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, autism spectrum disorders, impulse-control disorders, and even certain neuroses are manifestations of a single underlying pathophysiological process. The article incorporates genetic studies, clinical heuristics, and updated conceptual models—including a dimensional understanding of psychosis as proposed by Tim Crow (1990)—to support a unified syndromic perspective that transcends categorical diagnostic limitations.

Keywords: Unitary psychosis; General psychiatric syndrome; Kraepelinian dichotomy; Psychotic spectrum; Neurodevelopment; Mirror neurons; Dimensional psychiatry

Introduction

The diagnostic framework of modern psychiatry remains largely grounded in categorical distinctions established in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially those crystallized by Emil Kraepelin. Chief among these is the separation between dementia praecox (later renamed schizophrenia) and manic-depressive illness (now bipolar disorder). However, clinical reality frequently defies such rigid classifications. Comorbidity, symptom overlap, and diagnostic transitions over time suggest that many psychiatric conditions may not be distinct diseases, but rather diverse expressions of a shared pathophysiological vulnerability.

This article offers a contemporary reformulation of an older idea— the theory of Einheitspsychose or “unitary psychosis”—under the concept of the General Psychiatric Syndrome. This integrative model draws from neurodevelopmental, genetic, and clinical research, but above all from long-term, in-depth psychiatric observation in hospital settings. It posits that many disorders traditionally labeled separately (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, ADHD, autism spectrum disorders, impulse disorders, and even certain personality pathologies and neurotic conditions) may in fact be syndromic manifestations of a single underlying process. This view revives and modernizes the original notion of unitary psychosis, but reinterprets it through the lens of 21st-century biological psychiatry and clinical complexity [1].

Historical Background: The Theory of Unitary Psychosis (Einheitspsychose)

The concept of Einheitspsychose refers to a dominant current in 19th-century German psychiatry prior to Kraepelin, according to which all psychoses were surface expressions of a single underlying disease process. The boundaries between clinical manifestations such as mania, melancholia, delusion, catatonia, and confusion were considered fluid and shifting, with patients frequently presenting a succession of symptom constellations throughout the evolution of a single illness.

The Belgian psychiatrist Joseph Guislain (1797–1860) is often credited as the intellectual forerunner of this theory. In his 1833 work Traité des phrénopathies, he proposed that all mental disorders were variations of a core disease process characterized by four consecutive stages: (1) cerebral exaltation, (2) structural aberration, (3) oppression of brain function, and (4) psychic exhaustion. He emphasized “phrenalgia” (mental pain) as the common denominator of all psychiatric illness, triggered by psychological stressors such as grief, deprivation, or trauma [2].

Zeller (1804–1877), who translated Guislain’s work into German and directed the asylum in Winnenthal, became one of the main promoters of the unitary psychosis model in Germany. He asserted that various forms of mental illness were simply stages of one morbid process. Influenced by Naturphilosophie, Zeller emphasized the moral and spiritual unity of the individual and resisted attempts to fragment psychiatric diagnosis into rigid categories [3].

A major figure in the development of biological psychiatry, Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–1868) briefly worked with Zeller and accepted the concept of a unitary psychosis, though he rejected its moralist overtones. For Griesinger, mental illnesses were brain diseases, with symptoms unfolding progressively in the cognitive, affective, and volitional domains. He believed the evolution of psychosis could ultimately lead to the total disintegration of mental life [4].

From the 1860s onward, the theory of unitary psychosis was increasingly criticized. Kahlbaum (1828–1899), in his 1863 text Die Gruppierung der psychischen Krankheiten, argued for a systematic classification of mental illnesses into distinct clinical types. He saw the unitary concept as scientifically sterile and an impediment to therapeutic progress, advocating instead for a nosology based on consistent patterns of onset, course, and outcome [5].

Neumann (1814–1884), the most radical proponent of unitary psychosis, dismissed any form of diagnostic classification as rhetorical. In his Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie (1859), he stated: “There is only one kind of mental illness. We call it madness (Irrsein).” For Neumann, all psychotic symptoms were expressions of a single pathological entity— Einheitspsychose. His stance reflected a philosophical resistance to reductionism, even as it alienated the emerging Kraepelinian tradition [6].

In contrast, Kraepelin introduced a lasting dualistic nosology that separated psychotic illnesses into two main types based on prognosis: dementia praecox (later schizophrenia) and manic-depressive insanity (bipolar disorder). This framework dominated 20th-century psychiatry and relegated the theory of unitary psychosis to the margins of psychiatric thought [7].

In the mid-20th century, Klaus Conrad (1905–1961), drawing on Gestalt psychology and clinical observation, again suggested that various psychotic conditions may stem from a common endogenous base. He noted that patients with affective disorders often had schizophrenic offspring, and that many symptoms thought to be disorder-specific (e.g., hallucinations, delusions, catatonia) appeared across diagnostic lines. Conrad’s work, although framed differently, echoes the earlier idea of a syndromic continuum [8].

The Psychosis Continuum: Tim Crow’s Contribution (1990)

In 1990, British psychiatrist Tim Crow reignited the debate on the unity versus dichotomy of psychotic disorders with his influential article “The Continuum of Psychosis and Its Genetic Origins”. In it, Crow proposed that schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and schizoaffective disorder should not be viewed as categorically distinct entities, but rather as points along a psychosis continuum. This view directly challenges the Kraepelinian dichotomy and aligns conceptually with the older idea of unitary psychosis [9].

Crow suggested that these disorders share common genetic and neurodevelopmental underpinnings, with symptomatic expression varying according to individual vulnerabilities and environmental factors. For Crow, this continuum may stem from variations in cerebral asymmetry—particularly those involving the languagedominant hemisphere—which could influence how psychotic symptoms manifest. His work emphasized that psychotic and affective features often coexist and blend, and that sharp diagnostic boundaries may obscure the true structure of psychiatric illness. Crow’s proposal offers a robust foundation for understanding psychotic syndromes as interconnected phenomena. His model provides empirical support for the core thesis of this article: that many psychiatric disorders— including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and beyond—share overlapping genetic, neurobiological, and clinical dimensions.

Dimensional Psychiatry and Overlapping Syndromes

The following diagram illustrates how modern dimensional approaches in psychiatry visualize mental disorders along a spectrum, with overlapping symptoms and causes:

The diagram presents a dimensional model of psychiatric syndromes, ranging from intellectual disability and autism to schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar/unipolar disorder. It shows that symptoms such as cognitive impairment, negative symptoms (e.g., emotional blunting), positive symptoms (e.g., delusions, hallucinations), and mood swings can cut across diagnostic categories. At the etiological level, both genetic factors and environmental stressors contribute to the development of these conditions (Figure 1).